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Surveillance, Classification, and Social Inequality  
in Informational Capitalism: The Relevance of 
Exploitation in the Context  
of Markets in Information 
Sebastian Sevignani ∗ 
Abstract: »Überwachung, Klassifikation und soziale Ungleichheit im informati-
onellen Kapitalismus: Die Relevanz der Ausbeutung im Kontext der Informati-
onsmärkte«. This contribution deals with classification processes as an element 
of surveillance in the context of the growing relevance of (online) markets in 
information and the blurring line between production and consumption in cur-
rent informational capitalist societies. Using the example of social media, I ar-
gue that classification does not only appear as feature of the demand and sup-
ply side of information markets but is also an aspect of informational 
production. In doing so, the paper discusses insights from critical surveillance 
and advertising studies and relates it to important strands of class theory in 
order to learn about the social mechanism that establishes inequality between 
Internet service owners and users. The paper argues that a (revised) notion of 
exploitation and antagonistic social relations should not be omitted from theo-
rizing the information economy. Exploitation establishes an antagonism be-
tween all Internet users and the owners of the means of communication, sur-
veillance, and classification. 
Keywords: Exploitation, online economy, markets in information, class, classifi-
cation, surveillance, advertising, means of communication, social inequality. 
1.  Introduction 
In their paper “Classification situations: Life-chances in the neoliberal era” 
(2017 [2013]) Marion Fourcade and Kieran Healy aim at a revision, or better, 
at a further differentiation of class theory. Class situations have been conceptu-
alised, in their view, too much from the viewpoint of the sphere of production 
(exploitative labour relations) and the labour market (human capital or skill, 
occupation). Other markets – in the paper they are interested in the credit mar-
ket and debts – only appear in class theory in their mediating and stabilizing 
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functions for social inequality that, however, is produced elsewhere outside the 
market. They introduce the notion of “classification situation” to make visible 
an additional mechanism that generates social inequality within the market. 
They define classification situations, as distinct from class situations, as posi-
tions in markets that are consequential for one’s life-chances and are interested 
in the process of “how institutions systematically sort and slop people into new 
types of categories (which we may call ‘market categories’) with different 
economic rewards and punishments attached to them” (2013, 561). Such classifi-
cations “are not merely approximations to pre-existing social groups, though of 
course they may overlap substantially in specific cases. Rather, they are inde-
pendently, even ‘artificially’ generated classifications that can come to have 
distinctive and consequential class-like effects on life-chances and social identi-
ties” (2013, 560). Their starting point “is thus the operation of market institutions, 
not the a priori identification of fundamental social categories” (2013, 561). 
This paper does not engage with Fourcade and Healy’s analysis in detail; ra-
ther I understand it as a contribution to broaden the debate about the social 
phenomenon of market classification that their paper has fuelled. I share with 
them an interest in exploring the role classification processes play in the creation 
and reproduction of social inequality as well as an interest in rethinking class 
theory “in the light of techno-social changes generated by the advent of novel 
market devices” (2013, 569). My approach, however, clearly differs in its atten-
tion to the concept of exploitation as the important other side of the story of social 
inequality and consequently focuses on the reproduction of existing classes 
through the implementation of classification processes instead of claiming that 
new classes are created by these processes in the market.  
To finally arrive at this point, I combine a series of distinct debates and the-
ory strands, such as classification theory, surveillance studies, advertising stud-
ies, the sociology of inequality, and integrate them in a Marxist theory frame-
work of commodification, labour, exploitation, and class: I refer to the debate 
of the blurring line between consumption and production and the rise of 
prosumers as a starting point to introduce a broad concept of labour that in-
cludes the activity of Internet users. Social classification processes are intro-
duced as a tool to establish an unequal relation of surveillance between Internet 
users and the owners of the means of online communication, such as server 
farms, software, and platforms. Surveillance as a precondition of targeted ad-
vertising is crucial to commercialise the activity of Internet users and this op-
portunity to make money from users’ online activity is then situated within 
different approaches to class theory. 
The paper takes the following course: First, I introduce the growing rele-
vance of surveillance in the online economy. Second, classification is situated 
as an element of surveillance and linked to commodification processes. Third, 
social inequality creating mechanisms – individual attributes, opportunity 
hoarding, and exploitation – are discussed in relation to surveillance, classifica-
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tion and markets in information. Fourth, a revised notion of exploitation 2.0 is 
presented. I conclude that the Marxian strand, as the important other side of the 
story of social inequality, should not be omitted. Throughout the paper, I use 
(commercial) social media as a paradigmatic case where the described tenden-
cies in informational capitalism culminate. 
2.  The Rise of Surveillance Driven Culture Production in 
Informational Capitalism 
Two analytically distinct phenomena typically appear in the discourse about 
informational capitalism. Firstly, information, knowledge, and in a broader 
sense culture are produced as commodities. Adorno and Horkheimer were 
among the first to have analysed the commodification of culture within an 
emerging Fordist stage of capitalist development and have coined the term 
“culture industry” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002; Steinert 2003) to express 
that culture became a mass commodity that is produced for profit purposes. 
Two main socio-economic conditions that fostered the commodification of 
culture can be named. On the one hand, a significant number of the population 
could afford to buy cultural goods. On the other hand, the working day was 
limited to the extent that a significant number of the population has free time 
for cultural activities. Capital massively expanded into the cultural sphere and 
cultural content, cultural audiences, and cultural work were captured by com-
modification processes (Mosco 2009, 11-4). This trend continues and can be 
exemplarily understood by having a look at the World Economic Forum’s 
proposal to treat information as a capital asset and its reminder from economic 
elites to political decision-makers to find a right balance between individual 
privacy protection and economic innovation and growth (World Economic 
Forum 2011, 7). And secondly, speaking about informational capitalism can 
mean that informatisation is a quality of the way all kinds of goods and services 
are produced in a society, which is one of the core themes within labour, indus-
trial, and economic sociology. This paper engages with the first aspect – the 
new relevance of markets in information – but draws also on the second aspect 
as informatisation not only allows the effective linking and modelling of all 
steps necessary to produce any good, it also allows one to effectively link all 
stages of the economic process. For instance, information about potential and 
previous buyers influences how a commodity is produced or distributed. 
A key quality of capitalist market societies, according to Marx (Marx 
1867/1976, 129-37, 166-7), is that no a priori coordination between societal 
supply and demand exists. The actual buying process, thus the realisation of 
profits, is basically uncertain from the standpoint of the single producer but 
also from the standpoint of the consumer (Haug 1986). The market is the social 
site where it is decided whether a certain production was useful or not. It is 
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therefore understandable that the individual capital, in competition with other 
capital that does not exclude strategic cooperation among them, seeks to mini-
mise this structural uncertainty. Marketing and, as an important subdivision, 
advertising are important strategies to deal with this structural capitalist uncer-
tainty in particular under conditions of pending accumulation crisis and mo-
nopolized market structures (e.g. Baran and Sweezy 1966, 128). Data-driven 
marketing is a general feature of informational capitalism. Marketing activities 
become integral to all spheres a commodity passes through, from provision to 
transition to the consumer. Detlev Zwick and Janice Denegri Knott argue that 
“at the beginning of the 21st century, data-driven marketing is ubiquitous and 
is shaping business practice in a growing number of industrial and consumer 
markets” (Zwick and Knott 2009, 222). Consumer surveillance is a crucial 
element in this process. Maurizio Lazzarato argues that “rather than ensuring 
(as nineteenth-century enterprises did) the surveillance of the inner workings of 
the production process and the supervision of the markets of raw materials 
(labour included), business is focused on the terrain outside of the production 
process: sales and the relationship with the consumer” (Lazzarato 1996, 140). 
Whereas traditional forms of advertising are directed at broad groups of poten-
tial buyers, targeted advertising is tailored to precisely defined and differentiated 
groups, or even individual consumers. This demands more detailed, exact, and 
differentiated knowledge of the users’ wants and (buying) behaviour. Online 
corporations are able to provide such data and consequently surveillance based 
business models that offer commodities produced from data and information 
about Internet users gained enormous relevance in the online economy.1 
Joseph Turow (2011) provides a useful narrative of the development of 
online surveillance-based business models, focusing on the interplay between 
media corporations’ and advertisers’ (advertising agencies and their clients) 
business relations: “Advertisers and their media agencies reward publishers 
who help them pursue and expand the logic of individual tracking, targeting, 
and tailoring” (Turow 2011, 140). It started with the “click” and the responding 
“banner” advertising. The click was, however, deficient in the view of the 
advertising industry since it did now allow an inference to be made whether a 
new visitor to the web site or a visitor who has already clicked on a banner has 
given attention to the advertisement. The “cookie” is the technological response 
to this situation. The cookie made identification and user tracking across different 
websites possible. The utilisation of web searches for marketing and advertising 
purposes is a next step in the development of user surveillance. Mobile usage 
of media finally connects information about potential buying behaviour with 
concrete offline contexts of supply. 
                                                             
1  For a nuanced view that stresses a gulf between the discourse about the potentials of social 
media marketing and its limited use by practitioners, see Pridmore and Hämäläinen this issue. 
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The commercial media’s and advertisers’ response strategy to potential con-
sumer and user anxieties about, for instance, a loss of privacy (Sevignani 
2016), is to deny a general logic behind their surveillance and discriminatory 
activities and instead to frame these issues in individual terms. They have 
“learned that the key to managing such anger is to make the customer see ten-
sion-inducing rules as almost an interpersonal issue between company and 
customer. ‘Failure’ to get benefits or offers within the scheme would then be a 
private issue resulting from the rules of collaboration rather than one needing 
public remedy” (Turow 2006, 303).  
In the present situation, most Internet services are profit-oriented and allow 
advertising on the sites. Wikipedia is the notable and interesting exception 
among the most frequented Internet sites worldwide because it is not commer-
cially run and has no advertising. To the extent that media and cultural content 
is nowadays widely distributed online, it is reasonable not only to stress the 
relevance of economic surveillance in informational capitalism, but also to 
speak of a general “rise of surveillance-driven culture production” (Turow 
2005, 113) and to maintain that “by capturing consumer activities ubiquitously 
and in minute detail, databases become repositories of complex consumer lives 
by turning behavior into abstract aggregates of individualized and individualiz-
ing data points” (Zwick and Knott 2009, 222).  
Here is now the point where the example of social media comes in. I consider 
social media as a paradigmatic case where the described tendencies in informa-
tional capitalism culminate and the remainder of this paper develops its argu-
ments along the discussion of this subject. While people use social media for 
different reasons, such as getting news, providing information, staying in touch 
with friends, making new acquaintances, or organising events, they produce a 
wide range of data. All their online activity leaves valuable ‘data fingerprints.’ 
3.  User Surveillance, Classification, and the 
Commodification of Information 
Bowker and Star define classifications as “spatiotemporal segmentation of the 
world” (2000, 149). If classifications are ordered, a classification system origi-
nates that is “a set of boxes, metaphorical or not, into which things can be put in 
order to then do some kind of work” (ibid.). However, classification is itself a 
form of work, namely of attaching things to categories and to build systems from 
these categories (ibid.). Like work, classifications “are both conceptual (in the 
sense of persistent patterns of change and action, resources for organizing ab-
stractions) and material (in the sense of being inscribed, transported, and affixed 
to stuff)” (ibid., 152). 
I propose to consider classification as an aspect of (consumer) surveillance. 
Surveillance, however, goes beyond and directs classification by introducing an 
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important social distinction between watchers and watched. For Oscar Gandy, 
surveillance includes three processes (Gandy 1993; 2012): First, instrumental 
identification, which implies that an individual or a group is identified by an 
institutional other, following any means-to-ends consideration. The second 
process of surveillance is classification, which is the “assignment of individuals 
to conceptual groups on the basis of identifying information” (Gandy 1993, 16) 
for the purpose of a “maximization of similarities and differences within and 
between analytically defined groups” (Gandy 2012, 126). Third, there is as-
sessment, which is comparing conceptual groups with other conceptual groups 
and the examination of probabilities, for instance, of a buying act. Assessment 
itself includes the sub-process of evaluation and discrimination. Evaluative 
assessment aims at calculating whether a particular loss or benefit will occur in 
the future. Distinctive evaluation is based on previous evaluation and involves 
a choice to treat differently evaluated individuals or groups in different ways.  
In the literature, some authors see surveillance as a critical concept that de-
notes a negative condition that should be overcome (Gandy 1993; Allmer 
2012); others argue that there are also positive qualities of surveillance 
(Haggerty 2006; Giddens 1981, 169). All approaches have in common that they 
describe surveillance connected to the systematic collection, storage, diffusion, 
processing, and use of personal data. My approach is to situate it in the context 
of the commodification of information, which is first a descriptive concept. The 
following sections, however, link commodification to the problem of unequally 
distributed life-chances among people and to the capitalist logic of accumula-
tion that reproduces and amplifies social inequality. This refers back to my 
assumption that surveillance is based on an unequal relation because at the 
heart of this logic is the mechanism of exploitation. Although accumulation and 
exploitation are descriptive terms too, at least exploitation has also normative 
connotations that finally call for its abolition.  
Why is surveillance a means to commodification? In my view, surveillance 
helps to make user interactions and social relations manageable for economic 
interests by formalizing them (Schmiede 1996; May 1998, 252; Jessop 2007, 
120; Gorz 2010, 44; Rullani 2011, 375-6). To explain this, it is useful to intro-
duce a tripartite model of information that is popular in informatics (Fuchs-
Kittowski 2004). Within this framework, data, information, and knowledge, 
which are usually subsumed under the umbrella term of information, can be 
distinguished according to the common linguistic model of syntactics, seman-
tics, and pragmatics. Data are the syntactic expression of information. Infor-
mation is data that make a certain sense and knowledge is a relational system of 
information that is interpreted in a broader context. Social media are spaces of 
knowledges where users from different backgrounds of experiences interact. 
By sharing meanings and in order to communicate, users must reduce the plen-
ty of their knowledge to specific information. “Information always includes 
only designed and formalized excerpts of reality, i.e. those cleared of disturbing 
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conditions and complexities” (Schmiede 2006, 343). Information is, as abstract 
and formalised content, also the resource of knowledge. For example “a news-
paper report may be completely understandable concerning its words and their 
meaning for me as a reader, but due to lacking context its meaning may be 
completely incomprehensible at the same time” (ibid.). When we speak of 
digital communication and surveillance, human-computer interactions are 
involved and a further formalisation comes in: Human-computer interactions 
couple semantic and syntactic processes, they generate data from information, 
and information from data. While data is most formalised, knowledge is the 
less formalised expression of information. Commodification of social relations, 
sharing, and knowledge demands formalisation in order to separate valuable 
aspects from their social place of origin. The crucial step towards commodifi-
cation of user generated information takes place when the dialectical process of 
knowledge, information, and data production is not inhibited but appropriated 
by economic interests that aim to transfer gained information to other contexts 
than the communication process between users. Appropriation and transfer to 
the advertising market becomes possible because of the described processes of 
formalisation. 
The rise of the surveillance driven culture production depends on the exist-
ence of markets in information where Internet corporations can exchange in-
formation with an interested advertising industry. User surveillance and thus 
classification is the mode through which online activities are transformed into 
commodities. Thereby it is important to understand that information gained in 
the surveillance process is used in a twofold way by commercial Internet ser-
vices (Cohen 2008). Online corporations, such as those that operate social 
media, make a first use of these data by monitoring and using them to enhance 
the service and trigger more user interactions under their surveillance. For 
instance, while using social media, a friend of mine posts a caricature on his 
wall page and I am informed about this activity. Following this, I comment on 
the caricature and cite an online newspaper article that gives background in-
formation on the political event the caricature is about. Assuming the back-
ground information and the caricature are controversial, a lively debate with 
several users starts. The online service has successfully triggered more user 
interactions on its platform. 
Data, however, are used in a second way and this is the decisive one because 
it involves surveillance in its proposed critical meaning. The difference now is 
that the watched must not become the watchers and the secondary use it not 
necessary for the service to perform its primary social functions. Information 
about users could, in principle, be used solely for network and interaction en-
hancing means as it would be the case for alternative, non-commercial Internet 
services but this would allow, in principle, that the users can become the 
watchers. Social media corporations monitor, collect, and store as much and 
even more user data themselves. Or they allow other corporations to do so on 
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the platform. The aim is to sort “individuals on the basis of their estimated 
value or worth” (Gandy 1993, 1) or to generate consumer reputation profiles 
about the users (Turow 2006). The online surveillance process includes the 
transformation of user information into formalised data and vice versa the 
transformation from formalised data into advertising relevant information about 
the user, such as socio-demographic information and consumer preferences. 
Social media corporations’ secondary use of information involves making 
information generated from user data accessible to advertisers in exchange for 
money. Information, including privacy relevant information, is commodified in 
this process. Commodification always involves three qualities (Williams 2002): 
a) goods and services are produced for exchange; b) the exchange of these 
goods and services is monetised; and c) the production for exchange is moti-
vated by the profit principle. Commercial social media, as a rule, do not share 
the gained data about users with the users. In order to exchange data in markets 
they must exclude this option and they must have a property right in data to do 
so (Sevignani 2016).  
Through surveillance, users are made quantitatively comparable in order to 
be tagged with a price in the process of commodification (Symthe 2006; 
Meehan 1993; Bolin 2009; Caraway 2011). Users as consumers “are compiled 
in a marketplace that is technologically equipped to capture transaction records 
in digital formats. This information about consumption-related behaviors can 
be stored, collated, and circulated almost instantly with few spatial constraints. 
This digitized marketplace is structured to produce ‘consumers’ as commodi-
ties. By contrast, consumers are real people in a marketplace, breathing life into 
the institutions and habits of consumership. ‘Consumers’ are rationalized repre-
sentations of these actual consumers” (McGuigan 2012, 299). 
For Internet corporations applying the surveillance driven business model, 
the first use of information on user interaction is only a means to the secondary 
use of information for advertising. Only through the latter, the corporation is 
able to gain profit. This is only possible by enabling the former. The more users 
participate in social media, the more they interact on them, the more attractive 
the service becomes for new users, and the more interactions are triggered 
subsequently. Commercial services try to optimise user participation and social 
network building with regard to the users’ contribution to the secondary use of 
information for profit purposes but users do not intentionally produce infor-
mation for sale when they communicate or collaborate on social media.  
4.  Inequality Producing Social Mechanisms and Markets 
in Information 
In order to understand different social inequality creating mechanisms, we must 
carefully define the groups that are involved in an unequal relationship. As the 
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information markets that are attached to social media involve users, providers, 
and the advertising industry, inequality is imaginable in the following relations: 
between users, between social media service providers, between advertising 
networks or agencies, between users and social media service providers, be-
tween social media providers and advertising networks or agencies, between 
users and advertising networks or agencies. Surveillance and classification 
processes are most commonly problematised because they enable social sorting 
(Lyon 2003; Ball, Haggerty, and Lyon 2012, 119-21). For instance on social 
media, surveillance and classification sorts individuals into boxes that determine 
what information they will get displayed (Pariser 2011) or which kind of adver-
tising offers they will receive. However, what I am primarily interested in here is 
the inequality between users and (the owners of) social media service providers, 
which, as I will demonstrate, also involves some other unequal relations. 
There is relatively little literature that systematically discusses distinct ine-
quality producing social mechanisms (Tilly 1998; Therborn 2006; Diewald and 
Faist 2011). Traditionally, class theory is the place where the most relevant of 
such mechanisms have been identified with a focus on the economy. In a recent 
systematization Wright (2015) provides useful criteria to distinguish theories of 
class, first, based on their focus on the economic process (production, mar-
ket/circulation, and consumption), second, based on the relationality of the mech-
anism they suppose (none, external, and internal relation) and, third, based on the 
observational (micro, meso, macro) and political (small improvement, institution-
al improvements, systemic improvements) range. Wright (2015, 4) identifies the 
following main mechanisms that create bigger social classes and that underlie the 
main approaches to class theory: the effects of individual attributes, opportunity 
hoarding and social closure, and domination and exploitation.  
The first inequality creating mechanism focuses on individual attributes. In-
equality is explained by the differing social background conditions in an indi-
vidual’s life that provides the individual with different class-relevant attributes. 
These attributes then translate in different class positions in the occupational 
structure. In this case, the rich are rich because they have favourable attributes 
and the poor are lacking them. In the case of markets in information and the 
example of social media, this could mean that entrepreneurs, such as Face-
book’s Mark Zuckerberg, Google’s Sergey Brin and Larry Paige, and others, 
are now rich because they have had the right resources, such as breaking busi-
ness ideas, talents, a good training e.g. by elite colleges and universities, and 
accumulated social capital in order to achieve a CEO or a leading shareholder 
position. All those resources enabled them to found, develop, and sustain the 
Internet services that they now own to large extents. This approach is in princi-
ple a non-relational one because it sees no connection between the poor and the 
rich and reduces social inequality to individual differences because resources 
appear as an individual’s attributes.  
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However, individual attributes are also the effect of social attribution pro-
cesses and in this sense social relations are involved. For instance, breaking 
business ideas must be recognized and financed and good training is usually 
credentialed. Bourdieu (1986) develops his class theory as a relational one. His 
different forms of capital (economic, social, and cultural) are resources only in 
comparison to other positions in the social space and only insofar as they are 
recognized on a symbolic level (symbolic capital). Classification is a socio-
cognitive practice of applying and thereby accepting constructed categories in 
everyday life. Actors evaluate cultural objects and practices in order to classify 
themselves and demonstrate where they stand in relation to others in the hierar-
chy of the social space. To establish certain systems of classification does not 
only mean to situate oneself in the social space but also to permeate a certain 
image of the legitimate social order successfully. This theory links classification 
to social structure (class in itself and class for itself) but sees a relational inde-
pendence of classification from class by pointing to the rigidity of successfully 
established classification systems. The notion of classification situations (Four-
cade and Healy 2017 [2013]) also assumes that individual attributes are not simp-
ly given and marketers bring them to the market; rather the attributes are socially 
– that is in relation to others – constructed and created in markets.  
Attributes are frequently derived relationally (attribution), they are then af-
fixed to individuals. Social attribution or the perception of heterogeneities is 
relevant for inequality because it forms the starting point for any other inequality 
creating mechanism (Diewald and Faist 2011, 105). Without the creation and 
perception of differences among people (and the identification of different partic-
ipants in the information markets already assumed such differences), none of the 
following relational inequality creating social mechanism could be effective.  
The second approach is opportunity hoarding and, in contrast to the first 
mechanism, which focuses on individual attributes, it claims a relation between 
the classes; here the rich are rich because the poor are poor. Opportunity hoarding 
presupposes an exclusionary relation enforced by a form of power among indi-
viduals concerning different internalised and external resources. Tilly (1998, 35) 
names the following value-producing resources that are relevant for producing 
durable social inequality: Coercive means (e.g. weapons), labour (in particular 
skilled labour), animals, commitment-maintaining institutions (e.g. religion), 
machines, financial capital (for acquiring property rights), information, media, 
and scientific-technical knowledge.  
Private property is the most crucial means to enable a relation of exclusion 
for opportunity hoarding. Private property rights are commonly associated with 
four aspects: the right to use, to abuse, to alienate or exchange something, as 
well as the right to receive the benefits that the usage of something generates 
(usus fructus) (Munzer 2005, 858). Crawford B. Macpherson (1978, 9-10) 
traces the historical development of property rights and identifies important 
shifts in this development. Private property that is based on a relation of exclu-
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sion is first taken for property as such thereby neglecting communal forms. 
Then private property in the consumable means of life is identified with private 
property in producing these means of life. Private property can be or probably 
has always been constrained by the state or society (Christman 1994). Howev-
er, “it may be called an absolute right in two senses: it is a right to dispose of, 
or alienate, as well as to use; and it is a right which is not conditional on the 
owner’s performance of any social function” (Macpherson 1978, 10; see also 
Munzer 2005, 858). 
Private property is an exclusionary relation among people in regard to (in-
tangible or tangible) things. Marx described the historical process to establish 
such relations among peoples in the context of the rise of capitalism as primi-
tive accumulation and he makes the point that the birth of capitalism was a 
violent one (Marx 1867/1976, part eight). More recently, it was argued that this 
process is ongoing and an integral element of capitalist societies (De Angelis 
2007; Dörre 2015). Since the 1990s the Internet became a new space for capital 
accumulation and we could observe enclosure processes in this realm (Perel-
man 2000; Boes et al. 2015). Beside influencing the political process, creating 
and enforcing new intellectual property rights (Boyle 2002), there are also 
strategies of opportunity hoarding that make use of non-legal or quasi-legal 
processes (Harvey 2014, 133). Whereas the focus on private property sheds 
light on the (interplay of) political and economic processes, it usually does not 
grasp cultural aspects of the primitive accumulation or the raise of capitalism 
very well. Weber’s ideas of the Protestant ethic as an important aspect of the 
genesis of capitalist social relations can be seen as complementing Marx’s 
analysis of primitive accumulation (Weber 2012). It is crucial not to neglect 
that the ongoing enclosures or primitive accumulations demand, beside politi-
cal force and economic power, also a cultural legitimation. What do the eco-
nomic, political, and cultural aspects of opportunity hoarding mean for markets 
in information and the example of social media?  
In the case of markets in information and the example of social media, there is 
an exclusion of users from several mechanical, informational, knowledge, and 
media resources that providers control. For instance, users are excluded from the 
control and use of the huge and extremely energy consuming server parks that are 
needed to operate the services. They do not control the development of the soft-
ware that commercial social media use to provide their services, and users are 
excluded from the knowledge of how exactly algorithms are programmed that 
establish the link between the two uses of data and enable commercial social 
media to connect to advertising networks. The control over these resources gives 
social media providers the opportunity to valorise user data by selling it to the 
advertising industry, users are excluded from this opportunity.  
The concept of intellectual property and therefore private property in infor-
mation consists of the “idea that an idea can be owned” (Hesse 2002, 25) which 
first has to be enforced against the assumption that that “ideas are intrinsically 
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social: they are not produced by individuals alone; they are the fruit of a collec-
tive process of experience” (Hesse 2002, 36). This political struggle is ongoing 
(Benkler 2006; Boyle 2002), however, in practice, there are markets in infor-
mation and online advertising networks that are able to attract significant por-
tions of the global advertising fund and this becomes possible because user 
information is privatised. Commercial social media’s terms of use are binding 
contracts and provide the legal base to utilise users’ data for profit purposes.  
However, the opportunity to valorise user data involves some other econom-
ic inequalities between social media service providers themselves and between 
them and the advertising industry. Private property rights in information and 
the opportunity to exclude others from the aggregated information give rise to 
competition between marketers. In capitalism, there is a dialectic of competi-
tion and concentration, which finds its expression in the contradictory dis-
course about monopolistic competition (Harvey 2014, 137). Media concentra-
tion is thus not an exception from the rule but a regular and state aided process 
in commercial media systems (Knoche 2013). Empirically, we find a steady 
process of political deregulation or privatisation, which leads to more concen-
trated media markets, and subsequent re-regulation, which legitimates the 
concentrated status quo in respect to competition on an ever-increasing scale 
(local, national, transnational, global). Today, the Internet in general and online 
markets in information in particular are highly monopolised spheres and proba-
bly must be because otherwise these markets cannot be profitable at all due the 
specific qualities of information e.g. as a non-rival good (Benkler 2006; Rullani 
2011, 340-6). For instance, the global top fifteen websites reach a significant 
share of the global Internet population and most of them are based on the de-
scribed surveillance based business model. The advertising industry, in turn, 
consists of a few powerful provider of advertising relevant information, such as 
Facebook’s Ad Network and Google’s AdSense or AdWords (McChesney 
2013, 130-58; Dolata 2015). 
Concerning unequally distributed financial resources, the mechanism of op-
portunity hoarding results in strategies to realise monopoly rents. Critical polit-
ical economy’s concept of rent has raised a renewed interest in the digital age 
(Pasquinelli 2009; Caraway 2011; Arvidsson and Colleoni 2012; Huws 2014; 
Ouellet 2015). Rent is a key mechanism to make profits for Internet corpora-
tions. It is an opportunity to extract surplus value that is produced elsewhere, 
including, for instance, offline production sites and from corporations that 
advertise their products. More recently, rent was related to culturally produced 
sites (Harvey 2001) and Internet business models (Foley 2013). This reconcep-
tualization enables us to think that human activity is involved in establishing 
the preconditions of rent seeking. A monopoly, for instance, in access to a wide 
user base, is exchanged for money with somebody who thinks that her or his 
own business can be enhanced through it (by reducing the costs of the structur-
al uncertainty to realize the invested value on the market). The costs for access 
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(rent) are a reduction from profits, but an economically rational one since it 
allows a realization of higher profits than competitors can do without it. Having 
access to social media’s user base may – from an economic perspective – be 
more sensible than to advertise a commodity on a site with much less users or 
in a newspaper. 
Rent seeking strategies can follow conventional economic paths by aiming 
at establishing new intellectual property rights, realising monopoly prices 
through product innovation, making use of the economies of scale and scope, 
and network effects. However, there are also pseudo or non-legal strategies of 
opportunity hoarding in information markets. One can think of intentionally 
created opacity or making use of legal loopholes. Internet corporations actually 
apply both strategies to realise monopoly rents. For instance, insights into the 
use of personal information through social media providers are obfuscated 
through complicated terms of use and privacy statements. Using social media is 
thus largely based on an “uninformed consent” (Campbell and Carlson 2002, 
593; Fernback and Papacharissi 2007; Sandoval 2011). What is more, commer-
cial social media actively make use of different privacy (and tax) laws and 
states let them do so. For instance, Facebook chose to place its European head-
quarters in Ireland, a land known for its lower privacy law standards and corpo-
ration friendly tax policy. 
On the cultural side, there is the reproduction of what I call a privacy ideol-
ogy (Sevignani 2016) that consists of a notion of privacy that is strongly entan-
gled with the notion of property and self-possession. This ideology enables us 
to trade personal information, for instance, through our agreement to social 
media terms of use. At the same time, we find an ideology of sharing that con-
sists in a positive framing of sharing information with others and thereby ne-
glecting that this sharing also fuels private interests. The sharing ideology is 
supported by the powerful self-presentation of the online economy (sometimes 
in clear distinction from the ‘old’ economy) as serving social purposes and 
being the opposite of evil (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013, 261).  
Opportunity hoarding and the third mechanism, exploitation, both involve 
the exercise of power either in order to enforce exclusion or to control labour 
(Wright 2015, 11). Manuel Castells (2011) explores the forms that power takes 
in informational capitalism and distinguishes between four forms: First, ‘net-
working’ power is the power of those who have access to global networks over 
those who do not have access to them. Second, ‘network power’ is the power 
that results from the standards of the networks or the rules of inclusion in the 
network. Third, ‘networked power’ is the power of social actors over other 
social actors within a certain network. Fourth, the most crucial form of power 
is network making power (ibid., 776). It is “the power to program specific 
networks according to the interests and values of the programmers, and the 
power to switch different networks following the strategic alliances between 
the dominant actors of various networks” (ibid., 773). Network-making power 
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consists of two operations: programming and switching. Programming power is 
“the ability to constitute network(s) and to program/reprogram the network(s) 
in terms of the goals assigned to the Network” (ibid., 776); switching power is 
“the ability to connect and ensure the cooperation of different networks by 
sharing common goals and combining resources while fending off competition 
from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation” (ibid.). Network-
making power flows easily into network power: “Network power is the power 
of the standards of the network over its components, although this network 
power ultimately favors the interests of both a specific set of social actors at the 
source of network formation and also of the establishment of the standards 
(protocols of communication)” (ibid., 775). The first two forms of communica-
tion power refer to the opportunity hoarding mechanism because they help to 
establish an exclusionary relation. The third form refers to exploitation because 
power is used to control the activities in the network.  
Beside their genuine social and relational nature and the involvement of 
power to establish and reproduce a relation of inequality, there is a systemic 
interconnection between the opportunity hoarding approach and the third ine-
quality creating social mechanism that shows that these different approaches 
should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary on different levels of 
observation and problematisation: “Perhaps the most important exclusionary 
mechanism that protects the privileges and advantages of people in certain jobs 
in a capitalist society is private property rights in the means of production” 
(Wright 2015, 7). The exclusion of some groups from the means of production 
historically leads to a form of exploitative domination. “’Domination’ refers to 
the ability to control the activities of others. ‘Exploitation’ refers to the acquisi-
tion of economic benefits from the laboring activity of those who are dominat-
ed. All exploitation, therefore, implies some kind of domination, but not all 
domination involves exploitation” (Wright 2015, 9). Private property in the 
means of production enables owners to exercise control over labour. In the 
process of primitive accumulation a ‘fictitious’ commodity (Polanyi 2001, 76; 
Jessop 2007) is created. Human labour force must be offered and can be sold 
on labour markets but is not produced for sale. Labourers, deprived from the 
means of production, cannot make their ends meet without exchanging their 
productive capacities on markets.  
With exploitation, we see however a different form of relation between the 
unequal. The relation is not external to the involved individuals mediated by 
the unequally distributed control over resources but internal. The rich are rich 
because the poor make them rich and reproduce the unequal situation simulta-
neously; there is an asymmetric interdependency. Consequently, we can speak 
of exploitation if three criteria are met (Wright 1997, 9-17): First, inverse inter-
dependent welfare means that the wealth of some social groups is dependent on 
other social groups that profit less. Second, exclusion means that some social 
groups ensure that other social groups are excluded from the profit-generating 
HSR 42 (2017) 1  │  91 
conditions and the profit itself (through private property rights). Third, some 
social groups are able to appropriate the wealth created by other social groups. 
Exploitation refers to the final shift that property went through towards reach-
ing its capitalist form: private property in producing the means of life is identi-
fied with a specific property in producing the means of life, namely private 
property in the labour force (Macpherson 1978, 10; Pateman and Mills 2007, 
17-8; Polanyi 2001, 76). 
Applied to markets in information and social media, classical exploitation 
occurs because the social media owner buys technical infrastructure, such as 
server parks and software components, as well as labour force, such as ac-
countants, software developer, advertising specialists, etc., and organises the 
production of social media through which users can interact. Bolin (2009), for 
instance, argues that commercial social media’s employees, who operate the 
software and pack user data into commodities, are an exploited class. Thus there 
is, of course, a social relation of inequality within social media service providers.  
5.  Exploitation 2.0 
The business model that is of interest here, however, is not (primarily) based on 
selling users the access to the medium but is based on the secondary use of user 
interactions for profit purposes. Is there a similar mechanism specific to the 
described surveillance and classification based business models? Can a notion 
of exploitation 2.0 be justified? In my opinion, we need a three-step argument 
to answer this question positively. This includes, first and most crucially, a 
broadening of the notion of labour; second, to make a broad concept of the 
means of production as the decisive value-producing resource in capitalism 
plausible; and third, the identification of an equivalent to the exploitable ficti-
tious commodity of labour power.  
First, a broad understanding of labour is not restricted to a productivist and 
wage-labour centred view (Fuchs and Sevignani 2013; Fuchs and Sandoval 
2014). Dallas Smythe (2006) in the 1970s first speaks of the commodification 
of audiences through the corporate media: Just like labour power was commod-
ified and became exchangeable on markets with the rise of capitalism, audience 
power is now traded in the media industry. With the rise of a “surveillance-
driven culture production” (Turow 2005, 113) and most Internet services rely-
ing on advertising as their business model, Smythe’s notion of audience power 
was rethought. Fuchs argues that “advertisers are not only interested in the time 
that users spend online, but also in the products that are created during this time 
– user generated digital content and online behaviour” (2012, 704). The “work 
of being watched” (Andrejevic 2002) is now a key quality of using the Internet 
and the users participate in the production of the services. We see a strong 
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correlation between a commercial service’s user base and its revenues (An-
drejevic 2015, 7) in terms of extensity and intensity of time spent online. 
Alvin Toffler has introduced the term “prosumer” to express that there is a 
“progressive blurring of the line that separates the producer from the consum-
er” (1980, 267). Applied to the Internet, one can then speak of “produsage” 
(Bruns 2008) or the “produser” (Fuchs 2010). There is a long existing trend 
that consumers are put to work since it is a potential profit maximising strategy 
(Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010). For instance, fast food restaurants encourage their 
customers to dispose of their food wrappers by themselves. Some furniture 
shops let their customers assemble their purchases by themselves. Work that is 
traditionally performed by employed and paid workers appears now as unpaid 
consumption work. Ritzer and Jurgenson argue that although prosumption has 
always been a trait of capitalist societies, it gains particular relevance in the 
context of the Internet and web 2.0 which is “the most prevalent location of 
prosumption and its most important facilitator as a ‘means of prosumption’” 
(2010, 20). Producing and consuming takes place simultaneously in the context 
of web 2.0 services, such as social networking sites. According to Beer and 
Burrows “perhaps the key defining feature of Web 2.0 is that users are involved 
in processes of production and consumption as they generate and browse online 
content, as they tag and blog, post and share” (2007, 8). Users are therefore 
‘prosumers’ or ‘produsers’. Linked to the previous discussion about surveil-
lance, Christian Fuchs argues that “the combination of surveillance and 
prosumption is at the heart of capital accumulation on web 2.0” (2011, 296). 
On social media, users consume the web service and simultaneously produce 
advertising relevant information.  
The notion of online prosuming disentangles our understanding of work 
from the classical sphere of production and reveals that production also takes 
place in the sphere of consumption. It, however, rejects a productivist notion of 
work in a second sense: contrary to authors who make a sharp distinction be-
tween purposive and instrumental activities (in order to handle scarcity for 
instance) and an activity that aims at cooperation and communication, Fuchs 
and Sevignani (2013) assume the unity of these aspects within the work pro-
cess. This point is also made by Sean Sayers (2007), who argues that authors, 
such as Arendt (1958), Habermas (1984; 1987), as well as Hardt and Negri 
(2000, 404-5) use insufficient accounts of Marx’s theory of work and all hold 
that Marx is a productivist and a theorist solely of the industrial age. On the 
contrary, Marx has seen manifold forms of work that he conceptualises as forma-
tive activities. Sayers argues that ‘immaterial’ work “operates, as does all labor, 
by intentionally forming material and altering the material environment in some 
way, including through speech and other forms of communicative action, in order 
to create use values” (Sayers 2007, 447; see also Fine, Jeon and Gimm 2010). 
Such a broad concept of labour (see Fuchs 2016) can theoretically built on 
Herbert Marcuse (1965, 22; 1967), Cultural Marxism (Williams 1981; 2005), 
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Critical Psychology (Vygotsky 1978; Hund 1976), Critical Linguistic and Se-
miotics (Vološinov 1986; Rossi-Landi 1983); and the Post-Workerist tradition 
(Hardt and Negri 2004, 108; Terranova 2000; Boutang 2012). Raymond Wil-
liams, argues that “a major part of the whole modern labour process must be 
defined in terms which are not easily theoretically separable from the tradition-
al ‘cultural’ activities. […] [S]o many more workers are involved in the direct 
operations and activations of these systems that there are quite new social and 
social-class complexities” (Williams 1981, 232). In this context, it is important 
to distinguish between communication at work and the work of communication 
(Fuchs 2016). Communication and information generation are, firstly, aspects 
of coordination of the work process that phylogenetically rose with tool-using 
and tool-making cooperative work process (Holzkamp 2013); but communica-
tion and information generation is, secondly, also itself a form of work. Alt-
hough informational labour, such as online prosuming, is increasingly detached 
from nature, it never loses its material base. Information work is ultimately 
based on the activity of the human brain, which is a material system. It also 
objectifies itself in matter such as a notebook or it creates electronic impulses 
in a computer system. Although some work has no tangible outcomes, it is 
nevertheless material insofar as it produces and reproduces social relations. All 
work – as Marx understands it – creates or alters subjectivity; all work is there-
fore ‘immaterial’ or ‘biopolitical’ work (Sayers 2007, 448). Work is a broad 
category constitutive of the human that includes different types of work, such 
as agricultural work, craftwork, industrial work, and informational work that 
can be seen as evermore-mediated forms between humans and ‘nature’. Labour 
includes cognitive, communicative, and cooperative aspects. When using the 
Internet, we combine – in relation to others – our experiences and online in-
formation as objects of labour, with our brains, hands, ears, eyes, speech and 
the Internet or specific platforms as instruments of labour, and produce a new 
use value – the so called produser product. 
Social media users do not receive a monetary wage in exchange for their 
online activity, although there are (problematic) ideas that point in this direction 
(Sevignani 2016, 84)2. Feminist thinkers have stressed that there is exploitation 
beyond the wage and they have politicized thereby the private realm of reproduc-
tive work. For labour power to be sold on markets it must be (re-)produced first, 
which is traditionally made possible by female work performed in families. 
Non-wage labour “ensures the reproduction of labour power and living condi-
tions” (Mies, Bennholdt-Thomsen and Werlhof 1988, 18). It is labour per-
formed “in the production of life, or subsistence production” (ibid., 70). By 
highlighting the necessity of unpaid labour for the economy these Feminist 
                                                             
2  <http://wagesforfacebook.com/> (Accessed February 14, 2017). 
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thinkers broke with a wage-centrist notion of labour and thereby provided an 
important broadening of the notion of labour.  
The second and consequent step of the argument leads us to revise the 
means that are necessary to realise informational work. Undoubtedly, Internet 
users are free to exchange in markets. They are legally independent actors that 
consent to Internet services’ terms of use and no authority forces them to use a 
particular service. I would however argue that they are also free from the 
means of communication, surveillance, and classification. Although users can 
make use of communication technology and they might be involved in lateral 
or bottom-up forms of watching, it is, in my view, important to recognise that 
the means of communication and surveillance do not consist in the access to a 
single technological device but in access to a concentration of these devices. 
Server parks are a good example because it requires immense resources to 
operate them. Fourcade and Healey argue that classificatory systems, as means 
of communication and surveillance, “are by nature private, even to the point of 
being trade secrets. They are oriented toward the extraction of profit and often 
manufactured and managed in a quasi-monopolistic manner” (2013, 561). 
Internet users are free from the means of communication and surveillance and 
this situation forces them to use at least one of the available commercial ser-
vices in a highly concentrated Internet in order to be able to benefit from the 
Internet’s various functions and to socialise and live a good thus connected life 
under our given circumstances. In the current form of society, users are forced 
to put their privacy under contract. I would speak in this context, in analogy to 
Marx’s notion of the doubly free labourer, of the doubly free Internet user. In 
this respect, ideas to decentralize the Internet and social media are an interest-
ing way to erode the exclusion from the means of communication and surveil-
lance (Sevignani 2015). 
A monopoly of the means of communication enables social media owners to 
subsume user’s online activities under their profit interests. Commercial social 
media are able to set the terms of online communication by determining infor-
mation flows and clicking behaviour according to their business interests. They 
structure attention by highlighting sponsored messages and interrupt user 
communication by advertising. This is, in my view, a form of real subsumption 
of work under capital and stands in contrast to the frequently observed new 
relevance of formal subsumption of labour under capital (Vercellone 2007) and 
the rise of neo-feudal social conditions. In my view, privacy outcries exemplify 
the continuing and not merely indirectly exercised control power of capital that 
conflicts with control by users (Sevignani 2016).  
As it should become clear from the previous discussions, I see an analogy 
between the fictitious commodification of labour and information. This analogy 
is grounded in the broad notion of work that includes informational and com-
municative aspects. User-generated information is not produced genuinely for 
sale. Even if information production is subsumed to capital, this production 
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demands in significant measure conditions that are not under the control of 
commercial social media, such as experience, knowledge gained outside social 
media and the Internet (Jessop 2007).  
Third, based on the general contractual freedoms in bourgeois capitalist so-
cieties there must be a correspondence to the wage contract. And I think we can 
find it in the terms of use and privacy policy of commercial Internet services 
that grant them extensive property rights in user-generated content (Sevignani 
2016). In the corporate Internet, users have a double freedom because they are 
usually free from ownership of the Internet services but they are simultaneously 
free to exchange their personal data or their ‘produser’ product with commercial 
providers because they hold a property right in it. For instance, the user must 
contractually accept commercial social media’s data use policies and thereby 
grants extensive permissions that his or her data is used for advertising purposes. 
Exploitation 2.0 contributes to Internet corporations’ profits. Economic and 
monetary power reproduces the power that exploitation needs to perform. 
Money power or the power to hold private property in the means of communi-
cative production is transformed into network-making power that is in turn 
transformed into network power. Castell argues: “The metaprogrammers em-
powered with network-making capacity are themselves corporate networks. 
They are networks creating networks and programming them to fulfil the goals 
that these originating networks embody: maximizing profits in the global fi-
nancial market; increasing political power for government owned corporations; 
and attracting, creating, and maintaining an audience as the means to accumu-
late financial capital and cultural capital” (2011, 782). The owners of social 
media hold network-making power. They set the terms of use and design and 
program the service according to their profit goals (programming power). And 
they are able to connect the social network to the advertising networks and 
financial networks. Commercial social media control the access to potential 
consumers and are therefore able to connect or disconnect to advertising corpo-
rations’ marketing data and networks. They also hold the power to connect 
users’ social cooperation to financial networks, such as stock markets, for the 
purpose of gaining profits. Commercial social media have the power to link 
two modes of production together, namely social cooperation or the common 
production of social networks and commodity production.  
5.  Conclusion 
I started by pointing out that capitalist market societies, due to their lack of 
plan, urge market players to bridge economic uncertainty by the means of 
advertising (amongst others). Advertising in the informational age can be more 
targeted and at least promises to be a powerful tool for commodity producers to 
deal with the structural capitalist uncertainty to realise invested value. These 
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conditions gave rise to a surveillance-driven culture production and online 
business models that primarily rely on user classifications and surveillance. 
These business models revealed themselves to be very successful and created a 
class of Internet capitalists that ranges at top positions in the social wealth 
distribution. I then asked how this inequality could be explained.  
Fourcade and Healy (2017 [2013]) argue that markets do not (only) mediate 
social inequality produced elsewhere but contribute themselves to it by generat-
ing classification situations that come along with unequal market- and life-
chances. I proposed, from a critical political economy perspective, to think 
about how classification and surveillance reinforce exploitation in contempo-
rary informational capitalism and reminded of the important other side of the 
story of social inequality that goes beyond market mechanisms, i.e. the problem 
of social sorting, individual attribution, and opportunity hoarding. 
There is a class antagonism between all Internet users and the owners of In-
ternet corporations. Exploitation 2.0 first enables an inverse interdependent 
welfare: The wealth of Internet service owners is dependent on users, who 
profit less in terms of money and network-making power. Second, it fosters 
exclusion: Web service owners ensure that users are excluded from the profit 
generating conditions and the profit itself through private property rights in the 
means of communication, classification, and surveillance. Third, Internet ser-
vice owners are able to appropriate the wealth that is mainly created by users in 
their online time: Without the users’ activity, social media could not sell any-
thing to the advertising industry and could not be profitable.  
 What exploitation adds to the notion of unequally distributed life-chances is 
that conflicts between classes not only concern the distribution and value of 
resources, “but also by the nature of the interactions and interdependencies 
generated by the use of those resources in productive activity” (Wright 2002, 
844-5). Following this line of argumentation also means that omitting the con-
cept of exploitation as a key category to understand structural social inequality 
in informational capitalism and substituting it by an accumulation of market 
effects is problematic because it is not able to grasp antagonistic social rela-
tions. With exploitation there are social groups that are at the same time in 
opposition but also interdependent, in societies with monopolies in the means 
of realising one’s labour force – which includes the human capabilities to cog-
nition, communication, and cooperation. This implies at least the following: 
First, there are not only disadvantaged groups but groups that are excluded 
from access to resources. Second, these relations are inherently conflictual 
because improvements for one social group simultaneously mean losses for the 
other social group. Third, “the conflict over exploitation is not settled in the 
reciprocal compromise of a contractual moment; it is continually present in the 
ongoing interactions through which labor is performed” (Wright 2002, 846).  
Exploiters have to impose control technologies on the exploited. In the case of 
social media, wall pages are intersected by advertisements and promotion offers, 
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privacy settings leave the commercial use of generated information through so-
cial media capital unaffected, and users are lured into online walled gardens. 
Thus, privacy crises are inscribed to this mode. Finally, the experience of conflict 
and of power over the exploited gives hope for the affected to experience com-
monalities, to organise society and the Internet cooperatively in an alternative 
form, and not to naturalise class situations as fate that has to be accepted.  
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